PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE

REPORTS.
ATTACHMBNT.

A., having actual possession of the goods of his debtor, B..
under an unfounded claim of title issued an attachment
Priorlty of thereon. Prior to this other creditors of B. had
Lien, (oods
issued an attachment which, however, was subseConcealed
quently levied, owing to the fact that A., taking
advantage of his possession, had put them in the nominal possession of his attorney in a place known only to himself, so as
to prevent the levy of attachments by other parties till after he
had perfected his own attachment. The United States
Supreme Court holds in Dooley v. Hadden, 21 S. C. Rep. 259,
reversing the Circuit Court of Appeals, that A.'s attachment
is good and superior to that of the other creditors, notwithstanding the nature of his possession.
BANKRUPTCY.

The Circuit Court of Appeals (Third Circuit) has just
handed down a decision (March 22, 1901; not yet reported),
Bankruptcy affirming the ruling of the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania (In re Page, 102
Assets,
Stock
Fed. 747, 4 Am. B. R. 467), to the effect that
Exchange
membership in a stock exchange board is an asset
Seat
which passes to the trustee in bankruptcy. The
contention of the bankrupt was that it was a mere personalprivilege, and not property, citing Thompson v. Adams, 93 Pa. 55;
Pancoastv. Gowan, 93 Pa. 66; Barclay v. Smith, 107 Ill. 349;
Weaver v. Fisher, I 1 Ill. 146. The court refused to follow
some of the dicta in the above cases, and said that while it was
not property, in the sense that it was subject to attachment or
execution, still such a privilege had some of the incidents of
property. The court put the decision on the clause of section
70 of the Bankruptcy Act, which invests the trustee with (5)
" property which prior to the filing of the petition he (the
bankrupt) could by any means have transferred." The same
rule seems to have prevailed under the act of 1867: In re
Gallagher,16 Blatch. 410. Under the present act a license to
occupy a city market has been held an asset passing to the
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trustee: In re Emrich, i o Fed. 231, 4 Am. B. R. 89. The
same rule has been applied to liquor licenses: In re Baker, 98
Fed. 407, 3 Am. B. R. 412; In re Brodbine, 93 Fed. 643, 2
Am. B. R. 53 ; In re Fiszer,98 Fed. 89, 3 Am. B. R. 4o6.
BANKS.

In Richardson v. Olivier, lO5 Fed. 277, the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit) holds that a check
Deposit in deposited in a bank on the day it closed its doors,
Insolvent
and when it was known by its officers to be insolBank by
vent, remains the property of the depositor, who
Stockholder may recover the proceeds from the receiverwhere
they are shown to have come into his possession; and that
this rule applies equally whether the depositor is or is not a
stockholder, if he had no knowledge of bank's failing condition.
BILLS AND NOTES.

The well-known rule that though a party's name appears on
a note as joint maker it may be proved by parol that he is
parol EvI. merely a surety is extended in the case of Hoffdencelof
man v. Habighorst,63 Pac. 6Io, to where several
Suretyship parties signed a note as makers, but were, in fact,
and to the payee's knowledge, mere sureties for the debt of
another. The Supreme Court of Oregon holds that parol evidence of suretyship should not be excluded as tending to vary
the terms of a negotiable note, even though the principal
debtor's name did not appear on the note, proceeding on the
general principle that it is always competent to show that any
obligation, whatever its form, was made in fact for the debt of
another.
CARRIERS.

In Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. McCarty, 6o S. W. 429, it
appeared that a passenger having been injured by the negligence of a railroad company, made a written setinjuries to
Passenger, tlement in full with the company before it was
Iutuai
known that he had received severe internal injuries.
nistake
The Supreme Court of Texas holds the settlement
binding and that he could not recover for such additional
injury by showing that it was not known by the parties at the
time of the settlement, nor included therein. The case of
Lumley v. Railway Co., 22 C. C. A. 6o, in which an apparently
different view is taken, is distinguished on the ground that
in that case the settlement released liability for certain specified
injuries, and added a general release of all demands growing
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out of the accident, and the court refused to include in this
general release injuries unknown at the time and not otherwise
specified.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The status of the islands now under the control of the
United States, constituting the great constitutional question at
present, has some little light thrown on it by the
Relations
with
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Cuba
Neely v. Henkel, 21 S. C. Rep. 302, in which the
court affirms the order for the extradition of Neely to Cuba.
The ground of the decision is that Cuba is still foreign territory within the extradition act, none the less so, says the
court, " because it is under a military governor appointed by
and representing the President." "It is true that as between
Spain and the United States . . . Cuba . . . was to
be treated as conquered territory. But as between the United
States and Cuba that island is territory held in trust for the
inhabitants of Cuba." The court relies to some extent upon
the declaration in the joint resolution of Congress upon the
outbreak of hostilities in 1898, but this recognition of the
possibility of territory being under our jurisdiction and yet in
some sense foreign, and without the protection of the constitutional amendments as this case holds, materially strengthens
the likelihood of the administration being given a free hand in
the other islands, and affords a precedent for supporting the
ground upon which Goetze & Co. v. U. S., 103 Fed. 98, proceeded. Of course Cuba is held under very peculiar conditions, but the case undoubtedly tends toward the view that the
restrictions of the Constitution do not extend ex proprio
vigore to these new islands.
The question of the status of the Hawaiian Islands was
raised in the case of Crossrnan v. U. S., io5 Fed. 6o8, before
Hawaiian Judge Townsend, who delivered the opinion of the
Islands
court in Goetze & Co. v. U. S., supra. A distinction was sought to be drawn because this was not a case of
territory acquired through treaty with any foreign power, nor
a question of military occupation. But the court, in a very
brief opinion, upholds the tariff regulations of Congress regarding the sovereignty acquired here, just as plenary as that
acquired by treaty or conquest, and adding that the probability
of an early decision by the United States Supreme Court
makes it his duty to enforce even more than usual the rule as
to presuming the constitutionality of an act of Congress.
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CONTRACTS.

It is well settled that contracts in restraint of marriage are
void, but how when such a stipulation is only part of a consideration? Thus in King v. King, 59 N. E. I I I,
Restraint
a contract was made by which A. agreed to live
of
with B. and take care of him, .anl .lsb :INdct 'toriarriage
marry during such service, in consideration that he would provide for her what would be amply sufficient to make her well
off The Supreme Court of Ohio allows a recovery by A.
upon the death of B., holding that the void promise was but
an incident to the main engagement, which was for labor and
care. The court says: "The distinction between a contract
merely void and an illegal contract would seem to be an
important one." In the former case part of the contract when
there is a void stipulation may be upheld, but not so in the
latter. This case falls, of course, under the former class.
CORPORATIONS.

The United States Circuit Court (D., Mass.) holds in Hallet!
v. New EnglandRoller Grate Co., 105 Fed. 217, that where the
Subscribers' plaintiff had purchased and paid for stock in a
Rights, Mis- corporation of another state, which was issued to
take o Law him at a price below its par value in violation of
the laws of such state, and the certificate was some years
afterward declared void by its courts, that his ignorance of the
statutes of that state gave him a right to rescind the purchase,
as under a mistake of fact, and recover back his money. But
such right must be promptly asserted, as he was bound to use
reasonable diligence to ascertain his relations to the corporation.
On the insolvency of a corporation the creditors' right of
action for unpaid subscriptions is complete, so that the statute
Insolvency' of limitations then begins to run: Swearingen v.
Sewickley Dairy Co., 47 Atl. 941 (Pa.). "The credUnpaid
Subscriptions, itors," says Mr. Justice Mitchell, "need not wait
Limitations until full administration has exhausted the other
assets, but may proceed at once to ascertain and liquidate the
stockholders' liability, even though payment may not be
enforced until actual necessity has been shown."
CRI

ES.

The question of where preparation for a crime ends and an
attempt begins is difficult of definition, and is best considered
Attempt in its illustrations. Thus in Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 59 N. E. 55, a man was indicted for an attempt to burn a
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building with intent to defraud the insurers. It is held by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that an attempt to
induce the servant to burn the building was sufficient to warrant a conviction, but not the preparation of combustibles for
the same purpose. The court says (Holmes, C. J.): "Some
preparations may amount to an attempt. It is a question of
degree.

.

.

.

The degree of proximity may vary with cir-

cumstances, including, among other things, the apprehension
which the particular crime is calculated to excite."
DIVORCE.

The tendency of the courts seems to be to limit the scope
of cruelty as a cause for divorce to very narrow limits. In
Cruelty McKay v. McKay, 6o S.W. 318, A. had induced B.
to marry him by deceitfully asserting that otherwise she would
be disgraced, and deserted her two days after the marriage, it
being plainly inferrable that such had been his purpose from
the beginning. In consequence of this treatment B. became
greatly distressed and was ill for a long time. But the Court
of Civil Appeals of Texas holds that this is not cruelty entitling her to a divorce, since, it seems, she had recovered, and
hence her health was not in danger of being impaired further.
BJECTMBNT.

It is usually difficult to decide how far illegality in collateral
transactions taints the main issue, and it is not surprising to
Champertous find the law unsettled in certain phases of this
Contract question. One of these, it seems, is where ejectment is brought for certain land, and it appears that a champertous contract exists between the plaintiff and his attorney.
Will the court dismiss the action? In Ellis v. Smith, 37 S. E.
739, the Supreme Court of Georgia holds that it will not, that
the champertous contract must be dealt with by itself. It
recognizes a divergence of views, but regards the contrary
doctrine unsound.
GUARDIAN AND WARD.

The Court of Appeals of Kansas holds in Frazierv. Jenkins, 63 Pac. 459, that a husband of a guardian may not purSale,
chase property of the ward. The decision is put
Right to
on the ground that since the wife's interest in the
Purchase
real estate of her husband, though a contingent
interest, is unquestionably property, the husband of the guardian may not purchase, since this would indirectly allow the
guardian to purchase, which is, of course, forbidden.
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INSURANCE.
An interesting question arises in the case of Burt v. Union
Cent. Ljfe Ins. Co., io5 Fed. 419, where the Circuit Court of
Appeals (Fifth Circuit) holds that an action cannot
,cause of
Death,
be maintained on a policy of insurance on the life
Execution
of a person who was convicted by a court of cornfor~e,
lpetent jurisdiction of a capital crime, and was
executed pursuant to its sentence, although it is alleged that
such decision was erroneous and the deceased in fact innocent.
No case in this country, it seems, has previously decided this
question, and the court refers to the case of Society v. Bolland,
4 Bligh (N. R.), 194, 211, as being the only adjudication upon
the point. The policy contained no provision for forfeiture in
the event of execution for crime, and as to the contention that
the insured was innocent the court holds that this would be to
make the policy one insuring against the risk of a miscarriage
of justice and void as against public policy, and regards the
contract of life insurance as not contemplating death under sentence of the law. One judge dissents on the ground that public
policy does not prevent the review in a civil court of matters
passed on in a criminal court, and cites familiar instances, e.g.,
an indictment and an action in trespass for the same facts
alleged to constitute an assault and battery. So he thinks the
plaintiff should have been able to recover if he could convince
a jury in a civil court of the insured's innocence.
MANDAMUS.

Though a mandamus is the proper remedy and will lie to
compel a judge to sign a bill of exceptions, it cannot be
invoked to compel him to amend a bill of excepBill of
Exceptions tions by incorporating therein certain particular
matters, since this would be to compel the exercise, not of a
ministerial, but of a judicial duty: Montana Ore Purchasing
Co. v. Lindsay, 63 Pac. 715.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

In Peterson v. Seattle Traction Co., 63 Pac. 539, it appeared
that an employe of the traction company had been injured
LimitingLia- while being taken to his work by the company.
bility for
At the time of the accident he was riding on a
Negligence
ticket which the company sought to show had
been given in consideration of an agreement on his part to
assume all risks of accidents, whether "by reason of negligence" of the agents of the traction company or otherwise.
The Supreme Court of Washington holds this contract valid
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and not against public policy. The court says: "The plaintiff
was not bound to enter or remain in the defendant's employ.
Both parties were free, the one owing no duty, the other being
under no obligation to travel on the defendant's line otherwise
than as an ordinary passenger paying fare, and entitled to full
redress for injury through negligence"
The desire to include all parties liable, and thus be sure of
a verdict, seems in consequence of a little carelessness to have
Suit Against lost a good case in Doremnus v. Root, 63 Pac. 572.
Principal
A fireman had been injured in a collision, owing
and Agent
to the conductor's failing to obey orders, and he
sued the railroad company and conductor jointly. A verdict
was rendered against the railroad company, nothing being said
about the conductor, and the court entered judgment in favor
of the conductor. The Supreme Court of Washington holds
that it was error to enter judgment against the railroad, since
if the conductor was not negligent the railroad could not be
liable, and the judgment in favor of the conductor operated as.
an estoppel in favor of the railroad. And the court further
holds that it was not necessary that the judgment in favor of
the conductor be pleaded as a bar to a judgment against the
railroad, since the court would judicially notice the orders and
judgments entered in the cause before it.
NAVIGABLE WATERS.

The rule as to slow accretions along navigable streams
belonging to the riparian owner is applied under novel and
Alluvion
interesting circumstances in the case of Peuker v.
Canter,63 Pac. 617. In that case the plaintiff had not been
originally a riparian owner, but his land was separated from
the Missouri River by tracts belonging to the defendant. By
the erosion of these latter the river gradually worked its way
to plaintiff's tract and he became thus a riparian proprietor.
Then the river began to recede, uncovering tracts that originally belonged to the defendant. The Supreme Court of Kansas
holds the plaintiff entitled not only to such alluvion as formed
within his original lines, but also to an equitable proportion of
that formed within the original surveyed lines of the defendant's land and beyond to the river bank, though what this
equitable proportion should be it leaves to the lower court.
NEGLIGENCE.

The Supreme Court of New York, Queens County, holds in.
Wells v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 68 N. Y. Supp. 305, that
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Liability to where the plaintiff's intestate was killed by the
Licensee
ordinary negligence of the company while on the
track of an elevated railroad, either as a licensee seeking work
from a contractor with whom the company had contracted, the
company was liable, -bn the grpiund -that it ,owed -the same
affirmative duty of reasonable vigilance and care to a licensee
on its tracks as it did to a person there on business. Earliel
New York authority to a contrary effect, it is said, is overthrown by later cases. See De Boer v. Warehouse Co., 51 App.
Div. 289.
PARTNERSHIP.

In Perkinsv. Rouss, 29 Southern, 92, it appeared that partners
had opened an account with the plaintiff and continued purSubsequent chasing from him for two years, without notifying
Incorporation, him that they had subsequently become incorpoIndividual rated or recording their charter. The Supreme
Liability
Court of Mississippi holds them responsible as
partners for the debts of the corporation.
PARENT AND CHILD.

Though the Supreme Court of Rhode Island admits in Peacock v. Linton, 47 Atl. 887, that an education is a necessity, it
refuses to uphold a contract entered into by a
Agency,
Necessaries minor for tutoring during vacation. The minor
son is not his father's agent for that purpose, though he is
being educated at his father's expense, says the court. This
appears rather an arbitrary distinction, and it seems that the
circumstances of each case should rather, as they do in most
cases as to necessaries, decide whether the services are
"necessary."
PLEADING.

In Goodman v. Alexander, 59 N. E. 145, the Court of
Appeals of New York holds that in an action to recover
Infants,
against an infant for board furnished her, a comNecessaries plaint need not allege that the father or other person standing in locoparentishad refused or was unable to pay for
the board furnished, or that there were no persons who could
and would support her. This should appear from the other
side. One judge dissents on the ground that "it is not enough
to simply show that necessaries were furnished, for it must
also appear that there was no one whose duty it was to provide for such a one, or, if there was such a person, that he
failed to discharge his duty."
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SPECIFIC PRR-'OIMANCE.

The Supreme Court of Illinois holds in Anderson v. Olsen,
59 N. E. 239, that a vendor of a patent right cannot maintain
a suit for specific performance of the contract of
iutuality,
sale in order to enforce the payment of an agreed
Remedy
at LAw
price therefor. The court refuses to apply the
doctrine of mutuality and proceeds on the principle that the
remedy at law is adequate.
REPLEVIN.

The Court of Appeals of New York, discussing briefly the
history of this interesting old common-law action, holds in
Fraudulent Sinnott v. Feiock, 59 N. E. 265, that it will not lie
Purchaser against a fraudulent purchaser of goods when they
have been taken from him by process which is legal as to him
and not by any voluntary act on his part. The action, says
the court, is not one for conversion, but in theory to recover
possession of chattels. A different holding, it is plainly intimated, would be had in the case of a voluntary alienation.
TRUSTS.

In re Woods, 67 N. Y. Supp. 1123, upholds a gift to the
trustees of a cemetery corporation for the purpose of keeping
testatrix's family burial lot in order. This case is
Gliftto
Corporation apparently contrary to the views of/the court in
2WMussett v. Bingle,Weekly Notes (1876), I7o (Eng.
In Trust
Chan.) with which, it seems, the great majority of cases accord,
though its force is weakened by the fact that another part of
the decision denied the contestants a share in the residue.
WILirs.
In Wynn v. Wynn, 37 S. E. 378, the question was whether
the paper presented was a will or a deed. It was in form a
warranty deed, and executed as such, but it conwhat
constitutes tained a clause as follows: "To have and to hold
the above-described premises to the said A. of the second
part, etc., to be his at my death and the death of my wife, B."
It is held by the Supreme Court of Georgia that this is not
testamentary in character, on the principle that though the
tendency of the court in earlier cases had been to construe
such papers as testamentary, at present the court inclined to
give such a construction as would render the instrument
operative.

